{
  "pillars": [
    {
      "id": "defense",
      "name": "Defense",
      "scores": [
        53.30442861567049,
        93.55123419278294,
        80.82101497034178
      ],
      "summary": "European purchasing and sourcing alongside US and Chinese arms-trade strength.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Joint procurement",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 2025",
          "values": [
            "24%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Equipment sourced from EU suppliers",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 major order sample since February 2022",
          "values": [
            "46.6%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "External arms exports",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 2021\u201325 \u00b7 million SIPRI volume units",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "64,657",
            "8,584"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "External arms imports",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 2021\u201325 \u00b7 million SIPRI volume units",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "4,457",
            "2,037"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "EU = average of joint procurement \u00f7 40% target \u00d7 100, and EU sourcing share. US and China = 100 \u00d7 arms exports \u00f7 (exports + imports).",
      "limit": "The measures differ. Europe tracks joint purchasing and the origin of purchases. US and China use arms-trade balance as a proxy for industrial strength. Large exports alone cannot establish self-sufficiency or readiness.",
      "notes": "Europe uses the main-dashboard method. Its 24% collaborative procurement includes non-EU partnerships. The sourcing figure covers eight equipment categories. US and Chinese transfers include aid and second-hand weapons. SIPRI volume units are separate from prices and expenditure.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "SIPRI \u00b7 arms transfers 2025",
          "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf"
        },
        {
          "label": "SIPRI \u00b7 definitions",
          "url": "https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / SIPRI \u00b7 imports",
          "url": "https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.MPRT.KD"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / SIPRI \u00b7 exports",
          "url": "https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPRT.KD"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU procurement and sourcing \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#defense"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "energy",
      "name": "Energy",
      "scores": [
        52.173529411764704,
        62.94117647058824,
        55.85656126645124
      ],
      "summary": "Domestic energy supply and the share of energy use supplied by renewables.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Net energy imports",
          "year": "EU 2024 \u00b7 US & China 2023",
          "values": [
            "57.3%",
            "\u22128.70%",
            "23.35%"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Renewables in final energy use",
          "year": "EU 2025 provisional \u00b7 US & China 2020",
          "values": [
            "26.2%",
            "11.00%",
            "14.90%"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Half the score = 100 minus net imports, limited to 0\u2013100. Half = renewables \u00f7 42.5% \u00d7 100, capped at 100.",
      "limit": "The formula is shared, but the years and accounting differ. Europe uses newer Eurostat figures. US and China use older World Bank/IEA data, which misses subsequent renewable growth.",
      "notes": "EU net imports use gross available energy and renewables use gross final consumption under EU rules. US and Chinese international-series definitions differ. The 42.5% reference is the EU\u2019s 2030 goal and a scoring convention for US and China. Net exporters receive 100 import-independence points. Fuel and supplier concentration remain gaps.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "World Bank / IEA \u00b7 net energy imports",
          "url": "https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/EUU;USA;CHN/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS?date=2023&format=json"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / IEA \u00b7 renewable energy",
          "url": "https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/EUU;USA;CHN/indicator/EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS?date=2020&format=json"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU energy figures \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#energy"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "technology",
      "name": "Technology",
      "scores": [
        31.25,
        69.56521739130434,
        100
      ],
      "summary": "Chip industry and cloud supply, with different measures of domestic strength.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Chip value-chain global revenue share",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 2025 \u00b7 against 20% target",
          "values": [
            "8.8%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Chip demand supplied by EU production",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 2024",
          "values": [
            "22%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "European cloud-provider revenue share",
          "year": "Wider Europe \u00b7 2025 estimate",
          "values": [
            "15%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Global chip-making capacity",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 2024",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "9.9%",
            "25.3%"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Domestic cloud providers among six leaders",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 Q2 2024",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "6 of 6",
            "6 of 6"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "EU keeps its main-dashboard method: half chip revenue target attainment and half the average of domestic chip supply and European cloud share. US and China: half physical chip capacity relative to the largest of the three economies (25.3%), half domestic firms among six cloud leaders.",
      "limit": "The measures differ. EU tracks chip targets and supply shares. US and China track factory scale and cloud-provider presence. China\u2019s 100 means it leads chip capacity among these peers and all six cloud leaders are domestic; it does not establish independence in advanced chips, equipment or AI.",
      "notes": "US = average of 9.9 \u00f7 25.3 \u00d7 100 and 6 \u00f7 6 \u00d7 100 = 69.6. China = average of 25.3 \u00f7 25.3 \u00d7 100 and 6 \u00f7 6 \u00d7 100 = 100. Capacity counts all wafer technologies and foreign-owned factories. Cloud rankings give firms equal weight, not revenue weight. EU cloud share includes the UK. Chip-company revenue has been removed from the US/China comparison; Europe\u2019s original revenue-target measure remains unchanged.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "IDC / Commission \u00b7 chip-making capacity",
          "url": "https://zenodo.org/records/21931219"
        },
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 cloud providers, table 1",
          "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026SC0502"
        },
        {
          "label": "Synergy \u00b7 cloud markets",
          "url": "https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/cloud-is-a-global-market-apart-from-china"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU Technology calculation \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#technology"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "economy",
      "name": "Economy",
      "scores": [
        57.69059644059644,
        73.85560675883255,
        100
      ],
      "summary": "Half supply-chain resilience, half progress against industrial benchmarks. Europe retains its broader target basket.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Chip supply-chain vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.22",
            "0.20",
            "0.18"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Clean-tech vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.18",
            "0.28",
            "0.10"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Raw-material vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.28",
            "0.31",
            "0.24"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Supply-chain resilience score",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 three strategic supply chains",
          "values": [
            "74.4",
            "67.7",
            "100.0"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Manufacturing areas above the 40% benchmark",
          "year": "EU: 27 component areas / US & China: five finished-product groups, 2023",
          "values": [
            "6 of 27",
            "4 of 5",
            "5 of 5"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Manufacturing benchmark score",
          "year": "Share of assessed areas meeting the benchmark",
          "values": [
            "22.2",
            "80.0",
            "100.0"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Industrial benchmark half of Economy",
          "year": "EU: original three measures / US & China: manufacturing only",
          "values": [
            "41.0",
            "80.0",
            "100.0"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Economy = 50% supply-chain resilience + 50% industrial benchmark score. US and China use the percentage of five manufacturing groups producing at least 40% of domestic demand. EU keeps its original three-part industrial benchmark score.",
      "limit": "Provisional: US and China cover five finished products, while Europe assesses 27 manufacturing areas plus diversification and material reuse. Finished products can contain imported components. China meets all selected benchmarks; 100 does not mean complete economic independence.",
      "notes": "Resilience averages 100 \u00d7 the lowest EXVI among EU, US and China \u00f7 own EXVI for chips, clean technology and raw materials. US resilience is 67.7112135; China is 100. Manufacturing uses IEA 2023 production relative to domestic demand, Figure 1.12 (printed page 48, PDF page 50). The five groups are solar PV modules, wind nacelles, battery cells, heat pumps and electrolysers; cars and bulk materials are excluded. Chart bars are classified above/below 40%, without treating visually read heights as exact data. US meets four of five; solar modules are below 40%. China meets five of five. This is a shared scoring convention inspired by the EU 2030 manufacturing-capacity benchmark, not an official US or Chinese target. Actual production is used as a proxy for capacity. A common 2023 manufacturing snapshot matches the trade-data year and misses subsequent growth. US = (67.7112135 + 80) \u00f7 2 = 73.8556068. China = (100 + 100) \u00f7 2 = 100. EU remains 57.6905964: resilience 74.3626741 averaged with original target delivery 41.0185185. No recycling or mineral-diversification target measure has been added for US/China. Their target half is manufacturing-only; missing measures are not assigned zero. Finance, services and critical upstream dependencies remain outside the manufacturing basket.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 External Vulnerability Index comparison",
          "url": "https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/475d6e99-55ba-41bf-920d-1da2b44fdeb3/download"
        },
        {
          "label": "Authors \u00b7 index methodology",
          "url": "https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/external-vulnerability-index-a-tool-to-assess-trade-weaknesses.html"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU Economy calculation \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#economy"
        },
        {
          "label": "IEA \u00b7 manufacturing chart, printed page 48",
          "url": "https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ff76d6b7-587e-499e-9016-ca796d36801e/EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2024.pdf#page=50"
        },
        {
          "label": "OECD \u00b7 same manufacturing comparison, Figure 5.39",
          "url": "https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/measuring-science-and-innovation-for-sustainable-growth_3b96cf8c-en/full-report/the-impact-of-science-and-innovation-on-society-and-markets_4a8de259.html"
        },
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 EU 40% manufacturing benchmark",
          "url": "https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/green-deal-industrial-plan/net-zero-industry-act_en"
        }
      ],
      "supplement": "<h2>The five manufacturing checks</h2><p>Does local production reach at least 40% of domestic demand? One check per product, using the same 2023 IEA chart.</p><div class=\"table-scroll\"><table><thead><tr><th>Product</th><th>US</th><th>China</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>Solar modules</th><td>Below benchmark</td><td>Met</td></tr><tr><th>Wind nacelles</th><td>Met</td><td>Met</td></tr><tr><th>Battery cells</th><td>Met</td><td>Met</td></tr><tr><th>Heat pumps</th><td>Met</td><td>Met</td></tr><tr><th>Electrolysers</th><td>Met</td><td>Met</td></tr></tbody></table></div><p>These checks cover final manufacturing stages. They do not show whether every component is made locally. Newer US solar manufacturing growth is outside this 2023 snapshot.</p>",
      "calculation_inputs": {
        "resilience_scores": [
          74.36267436267437,
          67.71121351766512,
          100
        ],
        "industrial_benchmark_scores": [
          41.01851851851852,
          80,
          100
        ],
        "manufacturing_snapshot_year": 2023,
        "production_to_demand_threshold_percent": 40,
        "us_pass": [
          false,
          true,
          true,
          true,
          true
        ],
        "china_pass": [
          true,
          true,
          true,
          true,
          true
        ],
        "us_china_target_half_coverage": "Manufacturing only. Recycling and mineral-diversification target metrics excluded."
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "information",
      "name": "Information",
      "scores": [
        51.01302793,
        88.07094907135185,
        null
      ],
      "summary": "Four equally weighted areas of media consumption. China is excluded because comparable coverage is incomplete.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Cinema & TV",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 three viewing channels / US \u00b7 cinema only",
          "values": [
            "28.7",
            "95.5 \u2248",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Music",
          "year": "2025 \u00b7 national year-end top ten charts",
          "values": [
            "58.7",
            "90.0",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "News",
          "year": "2026 \u00b7 leading brands and ownership",
          "values": [
            "77.8",
            "75.0",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Social media for news",
          "year": "2025 \u00b7 creator base and platform ownership",
          "values": [
            "38.9",
            "91.8 \u2248",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Four areas, each worth 25%. US = average of 95.5, 90.0, 75.0 and 91.8, calculated before rounding. EU follows the main dashboard.",
      "limit": "The broader US score is provisional. Its screen measure covers cinema only, while Europe includes broadcast and streaming. Social-platform surveys ask different questions. These gaps matter when comparing the totals.",
      "notes": "Cinema: EU averages cinema admissions, broadcast film minutes and streaming viewing. US uses 2023 domestic film share of box-office revenue as its screen proxy. Music: nine of the 2025 US top-ten tracks feature wholly US artists. The mixed Korean/US collaboration APT earns zero domestic points in this conservative version. News: offline domestic leading-brand reach is 62/85 and online 47/61, averaged equally. Generic local-TV entries are unresolved. Social: 14 of 15 nominated creators have US professional bases. US-controlled platforms account for 111 of 123 summed news-use responses across six services. TikTok is coded by its 2025 ownership. Europe uses a separate Eurobarometer platform-importance question covering 12 services. All categories measure selected uses or chart slots; audiences can overlap. Reuters covers the US, Hong Kong and Taiwan, with no mainland China survey.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 EU cinema share, page 54",
          "url": "https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12608-2025-INIT/en/pdf#page=54"
        },
        {
          "label": "European Audiovisual Observatory \u00b7 US, page 44",
          "url": "https://rm.coe.int/focus2024/1680b5a5bf#page=44"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 2026 market coverage",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 US 2026",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026/united-states"
        },
        {
          "label": "US offline brand reach",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uqnEW/2/"
        },
        {
          "label": "US online brand reach",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/xLiBC/2/"
        },
        {
          "label": "Billboard \u00b7 US year-end Hot 100, 2025",
          "url": "https://www.billboard-japan.com/charts/detail?a=uhot100_year&year=2025"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 US creators, 2025",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news-creators-influencers/2025/United-States"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 15 nominated US creators",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ZREMa/5/"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 US platform news use, 2025",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0GgM6/1/"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU four-part Information method",
          "url": "index.html#information"
        }
      ],
      "supplement": "<h2>What unresolved cases change</h2><p>US news ranges from 75 to 100 if all unidentified local-TV entries qualify as domestic. Giving full US credit to the mixed music collaboration and all unresolved news entries would raise the US Information score to 96.8. That scenario leaves the cinema and survey-coverage gaps unresolved.</p>"
    }
  ],
  "date": "2026-11-10",
  "overall_method": "EU and US: equal-weight average of five pillars (20% each). China: equal-weight average of four pillars (25% each), excluding Information. Totals differ in coverage. EU uses the main dashboard methodology; US and China use alternative proxies where evidence differs.",
  "totals": {
    "EU": 49.086316479606324,
    "US": 77.59683677697198,
    "China": 84.16939405919825
  }
}